



THE RESURGENCE OF

BOKO HARAM



Disclaimer

The data contained in this report is only up-to-date as at Sunday, 20 November, 2016. Some of it is subject to change during the natural course of events. SBM Intelligence cannot accept liability in respect of any errors or omissions that may follow such events that may invalidate data contained herein.

Our researchers employed methods such as desk research and phone interviews to collate the available data. Our editors sifted through the data and prepared the report, using various proprietary tools to fact-check and copy edit the information gathered. A baseline of accurate and comprehensive historic data is collected from respondents and publicly-available information, including from research partners, newspapers and government agencies.

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
The Boko Haram insurgency entered its seventh year at the beginning of 2016, and a number of important factors have had a substantial effect on developments on this front. In May 2015, Muhammadu Buhari was sworn in as President of Nigeria on an electoral platform that included taking a tougher stance on security issues. Before the elections, a troop surge belatedly approved by the Goodluck Jonathan administration led to marked improvements on the ground in Nigeria's North East.

Buhari pledged to increase troop numbers, facilitate the availability of arms and ammunition, improve troop welfare and engage in dialogue where necessary, as part of a holistic security strategy. Through the year, substantial gains were recorded as the sect was forced to transition from arrogantly perpetrating acts of mass terror – bombing civilian and military infrastructure, wholesale sacking of towns, territorial acquisition and in its most infamous case, the kidnapping of 273 girls from their school dormitory in Chibok, Borno State in April 2014 – to a more minimalist strategy of targeted attacks at the formations and stations of the Nigerian military as well as the joint task force assembled by Nigeria's neighbours – Cameroon, Chad and Niger as well as raids on the villages, towns and cities that dot the vastness of Nigeria's North East.

Utilising a fairly extensive network of contacts, resources and third party news sources, SBM Intelligence has tracked the nature, locations and severity of Boko Haram's activities over the course of 2016 and what they reveal is a group which while considerably depleted in numbers, material and access to some of its traditional strongholds, still displays an intimate and remarkable

understanding of the geography of its area of operation and is still able to inflict significant hardship on the militaries of the region and more tragically, its residents. Also, it shows a Boko Haram which while it has changed its tactics is still committed to the ultimate goal of taking Maiduguri.


Attacks per state in 2016



This report shows that the military offensive while dealing a severe blow to the Islamist group, has not been as successful in its fundamental objective to degrade and eliminate the Boko Haram threat. The group's operational capacity to plan and execute attacks remains for the most part, and it has exhibited a clear shift in its organisational thinking from merely opposing the policies and idea of a state it severely detests to one determined to spread chaos, promote an ideology of

extremism with the aim of increasingly radicalising its followers to achieve what are decidedly more globalist goals. Boko Haram seems to be more willing to embrace its role as part of the wider global jihadist effort to counter established nation states, with it being the chief anarchic antagonist in West Africa and the recent surge in attacks by the group in the later part of 2016 serves as a warning that much remains to be accomplished by Nigeria and its allies if the group is to be effectively defeated.


Attacks per month in 2016





2016 started off fairly well for the military effort to end the Boko Haram insurgency. SBM compilations show that the group averaged 4.1 attacks in the three Northeastern states of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe over the course of the first half of the year. In one month, April, Boko Haram was able to muster only one effort – an attempted suicide bombing in Maiduguri that was

thwarted by the security forces. Within that time, the group suffered severe casualties, losing 431 of its fighters, nearly half of this year's losses, according to a compilation of figures from the military and other third party sources. Within that same time, the Nigerian military lost less than 200 soldiers.



Casualty Type	Count
Military	71
Boko Haram	929
Civilian	240

Increased troop morale, growing cooperation and coordination between Nigeria and its neighbours, as well as partners in the West, especially France, along with the fallout from the goodwill caused by a new, popular government in Abuja, which brought fresh faces and the promise of a fresh way to approaching the half-decade old conflict led to significant gains on the ground, including the announcement, in August 2016, of the killing of Abubakar Shekau, the group's leader, shortly after a faction fight within the group came to light.


The region's militaries focused not only on destroying the group's fighting force but also reclaiming lost territory and rolling back the group's gains as well as blessing the launch of a counteroffensive aimed at conquering the group's heartland in the Sambisa forest lands of eastern Borno.

Boko Haram seems to have initially struggled to respond and adjust to this new reality and its body count significantly spiked as a result.

However, growing groans of frustration with the military hierarchy in Abuja by officers on the frontline, chatter of poor soldier welfare and reports of human rights abuses by rank and file soldiers, the poor coordination and delivery of aid to internally displaced persons by federal and state relief agencies amid charges of diversion of relief material and other forms of corruption and a strange emphasis on holding already gained territory vis-a-vis taking territory from the enemy contributed to a lull in the military's effort on the ground that afforded Boko Haram the time to regroup, strategise and launch a series of coordinated attacks over a series of locations that roughly forms an arch around the Borno state capital of Maiduguri.



Locations of Boko Haram incidents with fatalities within the last six months.



**TABLE SHOWING LOCATIONS AND A BREAKDOWN OF FATALITIES
OF BOKO HARAM ATTACKS IN 2016 UP TO NOVEMBER 20, 2016**

Date	State	Location	Military fatalities	Terrorist fatalities	Civilian fatalities	Notes
21 January	Taraba	Residents of Bali and Gassol Local Government Area. Taraba State				Terrorists lunch attack. No number of casualties reported
22 January	Borno	t Afe, Kudiye, Souma, Dikwa Mijigeta, Mida villages of Borno state		63		Troops free 370 hostages, kill 63 terrorists
22 January	Borno	Buratai town in Borno State				Several killed as insurgents attack Buratai
30 January	Adamawa	Market in Gombi in Adamawa state			10	10 civilians killed
31 January	Borno	Dalori village in northeastern Nigeria		90		90 terrorists killed
03 February	Borno	Boboshe, Garidawaji and Mamawari villages in Dikwa local government		100		100 terrorists killed
10 February	Borno	Maiduguri		2	58	2 female suicide bombers and 58 civilians killed
10 February	Borno	Budumri, Nigeria		25		25 terrorists killed, eight arrested
11 February	Borno	Dikwa, northeast Nigeria.			58	58 civilians killed and 78 injured
24 February	Borno	Talala and Kumshe axis		20		20 terrorists killed
09 March	Borno	Sambisa forest from Damboa, Tokumbere and Pulka axis of Borno		18		18 terrorists killed
16 March	Borno	Maiduguri		18	25	25 civilians killed 26 injured
21 March	Borno	Dawashi		7		7 terrorists killed
21 March	Borno	Maiduguri		19		19 terrorists killed 67 rescued
25 March	Borno	Maiduguri		2		2 female suicide bombers killed
24 April	Borno	Maiduguri		1		1 suicide bomber killed
12 June	Borno	Muska village in Gamboru Ngala Local Government Area		10		10 terrorists killed
12 June	Borno	Pulka village, Gwoza LGA, Borno		6		6 Boko Haram militants

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14 June	Borno	Woza Local Government Area of Borno State.		6		6 terrorists killed
15 June	Borno	Dikwa-Mafa-Maiduguri road		2		2 terrorists killed 57 rescued
17 June	Yobe	Gishiwa Dabua area of Potiskum Yobe State.				2 terrorists arrested
28 June	Borno	Maiduguri.		2		2 suicide bombers blew themselves up
29 June	Borno	Along the Cameroonian borders.				24 terrorists arrested
29 June	Borno	At Musari village in the restive Borno State.		58		58 terrorists killed
5 July	Borno	Monguno town, Borno		6		6 Boko Haram militants
8 July	Borno	Damboa, Nigeria			6	6 Muslims
9 July	Borno	Kala Balge LGA, Borno		16		16 Boko Haram Militants
12 July	Borno	Kau-Tuva, Damboa LGA, Borno			4	4 persons
13 July	Borno	Kangarwa northern Bornu		25		25 terrorists killed
29 July	Borno	Bama, Borno State				3 civilians 2 soldiers injured
4 August	Borno	Sabon Gari, Damboa Local Government Area of Borno				Arrested Mohammed Zauro
16 August	Borno	Kangarwa, Borno State		16		12 soldiers injured, 16 terrorists killed
21 August	Borno	Kuruburu village of Damboa Local Government Area (LGA) of Borno State			7	7 civilians killed, abducts 13
24 August	Borno	Darul Jamel on the fringes of Sambisa forest in Borno		2		2 terrorists killed
24 August	Borno	A location between Malam Fatori and own troops location at Kangarwa.		300		300 terrorists killed

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12 September	Borno	Kara Cattle market axis, at Dikwa Local Government Area.		1		1 female suicide bomber killed
14 September	Yobe	Gaidam Local Government Area of Yobe State		4		4 Boko Haram members
18 September	Borno	Kwamjilari, few kilometres from Chibok, Borno			8	8 Church worshippers
19 September	Borno	Sanda general area, Maiduguri			6	6 persons
19 September	Borno	Dalakalari, Mafa Local Government Area of Borno State.			6	43 rescued civilians, 500 cows rescued
20 September	Borno	Tallari village near Chibok			2	2 civilians killed
20 September	Borno	Damboa Rd, Maiduguri			6	6 Civilian killed 3 soldiers injured
21 September	Borno	Around the border with Niger Republic, Borno				Suspected terrorist Mallam Fatori captured
24 September	Borno	Dikwa-Gambarou, Borno	4	22		4 soldiers, 22 terrorists
26 September	Borno	Miyanti and Dareljamal in Borno	4	3		3 Boko Haram terrorists killed, 4 soldiers 19 injured
26 September	Borno	Dikwa-Gambarou road in Borno	4	22		22 terrorists, 4 soldiers killed
27 September	Borno	Kuburwva village of Chibok Local Government Area of Borno				No casualties
28 September	Borno	Bulabulin, Borno		9		9 Boko Haram
29 September	Borno	Cattle market, Maiduguri		3		3 terrorists arrested
4 October	Borno	Kwaya Kusar Local Government Area in northern Borno		3		3 suspected terrorists wives arrested
11 October	Borno	Kwashebe village of Jere Local Government Area of Borno State			5	5 civilians killed
12 October	Borno	Maiduguri			8	8 persons
12 October	Borno	Juwano villages in Jere Local Government Area		2		2 terrorists killed
18 October	Borno	Ghashghar in Northeast Borno State.	20			20 soldiers killed, 13 injured
29 October	Borno	Maiduguri		1		1 suicide bomber

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
Date	State	Location	Military fatalities	Terrorist fatalities	Civilian fatalities	Notes
30 October	Borno	Damboa LGA, Borno State	9			Aleast 5 soldiers, 4 civilian JTF
30 October	Borno	Damboa Rd, Maiduguri		1		1 suicide bomber killed
31 October	Borno	Damboa LGA, Borno State	20	5		5 terrorists, 19 soldier and a Civilian-JTF killed
31 October	Borno	Damboa LGA, Borno State	5		4	5 soldiers 4 civilians killed
01 November	Borno	Gubio, Maiduguri			9	9 persons
02 November	Borno	Marte, Nigeria		6		6 terrorists killed
04 November	Borno	Monguno-Brimari		2		2 terrorists killed
05 November	Borno	Yamtakei in Gwoza Local Government Area in Borno	1	5		5 terrorists killed, 1 soldier killed
07 November	Borno	Banki – Usmanari – Kumshe road	2	13		2 soldiers, 13 terrorist
07 November	Borno	Kangarwa Village	1	13		1 soldier, 13 terrorist
11 November	Borno	Maimalari military barracks, Maiduguri		3		3 female suicide bombers
11 November	Borno	South of Bama, Borno		14		11 terrorists, 3 Suicide bombers
14 & 15 November	Borno	Dasa and Duwabayi, Monguno LGA, Borno			22	22 persons
15 November	Borno	Bitu in Borno	1			1 army officer, 8 others
18 November	Borno	Bitu in Borno		4	2	2 Civilian-JTF, 4 terrorists

The numbers tallied by SBM Intelligence from the second half of the year show a clear rise in successful Boko Haram operations with an attendant spike in military and civilian casualties on the Nigerian side.

While June was the worst month in 2016 for Boko Haram with 318 fighters lost, October proved to be the costliest month for the Nigerian military. In one incident, the army declared one officer and 45 soldiers missing in a major Boko Haram attack on October 17. The incident, initially denied by the military when reported first by the newspaper Premium Times, was only officially confirmed when the military formally notified the families of the 46 personnel, drawn from nine army battalions and divisions on November 20 and requested that their next of kin forward bank details for onward remittance

of accrued payments. The soldiers in question had been on deployment in Gashiga, which sits on the northernmost edge of Borno, as part of the 'Operation Gama Aiki' aimed at displacing insurgents hibernating around the Nigerian border with Niger and Chad when a daring nighttime raid by the group led to the single largest loss of military personnel this year. In its wake, the military opened a secret inquiry into the attack after some brigade commanders raised questions about the conduct of the soldiers. Also, the security forces stepped up the breadth and intensity of their counterinsurgency operations.

In November, Boko Haram recorded 60 verifiable losses and an unspecified number of prisoners of war while the military reported just five losses.





In the end, the real story of the Boko Haram insurgency has been the incalculable human cost it has left in its wake. The conflict has led to the creation of the worst humanitarian crisis to occur within Nigeria's borders since the civil war.

A 2015 report by the Internal Displaced Monitoring Centre and the Norwegian Refugee Council showed that the country hosts 2.15 million persons displaced by the Boko Haram insurgency. The UN says 4.5 million people need food aid across the north-east. UNICEF says an estimated 134 children may be dying daily in camps for Internally Displaced Persons, while the aid group, Doctors Without Borders says nearly 200 refugees fleeing Boko Haram attacks have died of starvation and dehydration in Bama camp, one of 27 such camps, alone. SBM Intelligence had earlier

in the year, reported on the scale of this crisis and how the effort to reintegrate people who have been uprooted from their homes and lands has been manifestly insufficient. It was our primary observation that IDPs were not receiving the resources that had been allocated to them, instead having to navigate a morass of bureaucratic inefficiency, poor coordination between relief agencies and between government officials and private donor/humanitarian organisations, a system of diverting resources, official corruption and in a significant number of cases – such human rights abuses as government aid officials requesting for sex and other inducements from needy IDPs.

Our official tally of civilian casualties during the course of 2016 stands at 240, with more than half (62 percent) of those losses occurring in the first three months of the year.

Finally, Boko Haram attacks this year have been overwhelmingly concentrated in its home state of Borno – with 67 documented attacks.

The other states which have witnessed documented and verifiable attacks with links to the Islamist sect are Adamawa (1), Taraba (1) and Yobe (2). This is largely a reflection of the fact that the group has been pegged back to its homelands by the massive military effort deployed by the regional joint task force to destroy it. It is also worth noting that while the group has lost most of its holdings in the regions bordering Nigeria's Borno, especially Cameroon's North-west Province, the ideology that caused it to sprout still exists.

The danger of the kind of radicalisation that brought the group into existence, is that it is mostly based on ideology. This means even if the structures have been destroyed, the ideology will still find breeding grounds in the minds of those who believe in its motives and ways, implying that even without a vibrant mode of expressing the vices and activities, individual elements will carry on the gospel and spread the ideology, this singular reason is why insurgencies like this can last generations before being subdued. Nigeria must bear this in mind, and be prepared for the fact that this group will be around for a long time. There are no technical victories here.

ABOUT SBM INTEL

SBM Intel is an Africa-focused market intelligence and communications consulting firm focused on addressing the critical need for market data and big data analytics.

We employ various methods of data collection such as personal interviewing, telephone, mail and the Internet. Depending on the survey design, our methods can be used separately or combined. Our Data Collection Methodology (DCM) team advises on data collection methods for all ONS social and business surveys. With clients both within the business and the wider government community, we aim to provide expert advice on data collection procedures and carry out research leading to improvements in survey quality.

Our firm's strategic communication services are designed to influence the stakeholders critical to our clients' objectives. We are a lean and fast machine that combines creative messaging and the right channels to deliver measurable and competitive business results.

We help organisations identify opportunities, keep an eye on the competition and be informed about market trends. We also combine our in-depth understanding of the Nigerian market with 360 degrees strategic communication skills to influence those that matter most to our clients

Since 2014, when SBM Intel started its operations, the firm has provided data analytics and strategic communication solutions to dozens of clients across various sectors in Nigeria, Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire and the United Kingdom.

In 2015 we became a partner to Stratfor, an American geopolitical intelligence firm that provides strategic analysis and forecasting to individuals and organisations around the world, including the various United States departments and agencies like the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI). Since the partnership came into effect, several SBM Intel generated reports have been published on the Stratfor website; stratfor.com.