



a look at NIGERIA's

security situation



Disclaimer

The data contained in this report is only up-to-date as at Friday, 16 December, 2016. Some of it is subject to change during the natural course of events. SB Morgen Intelligence cannot accept liability in respect of any errors or omissions that may follow such events that may invalidate data contained herein.

Our researchers employed methods such as one-on-one interviews, desk research and three-step verification to collate the available data. Our editors sifted through the data and prepared the report, using various proprietary tools to fact-check and copy edit the information gathered. The incidents reported here are only those that we could verify via at least two external parties.

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Nigeria's security situation in 2016 raised a lot of concern and birthed a good number of discussions. In that year, there were surges in cattle rustling, attacks by pastoralists on farming communities, oil theft related violence, and attacks on oil facilities in the Niger Delta region. The Boko Haram insurgency, after a brief lapse, witnessed an increase in suicide attacks, and attacks on military units. All these, and other adventures, ensured that Nigeria's security apparatus had their hands full all year.

The total number of events with fatalities in the various mentioned conflicts, which we have been able to verify, are tabulated in this report.

It is worth noting that the casualty figures here are figures that SBM Intelligence has verified independently, and are significantly less than the figures that have been given by the media and various interest groups over the course of 2016 and in the first few days of 2017.

Summary

SBM Intelligence curated attacks and fatalities from those attacks in three categories of security challenges in 2016.


1. Boko Haram Insurgency
2. The pastoral conflict, involving cattle rustling and attacks by Fulani herdsmen
3. Niger Delta Oil Militancy

The key findings were as follows:

- Boko Haram remained the most active threat in terms of number of attacks. However, the tide has shifted and 75% of the fatalities in the Boko Haram insurgency are now Boko Haram fighters themselves. The average number of fatalities per Boko Haram attack has been significantly reduced to 17, implying a reduction in the fighting capabilities of the terrorists.
- The pastoral conflict is the most deadly threat, with with 470 victims killed as a result of cattle rustling, and 1,425 killed in attacks involving Fulani herdsmen. The average number of fatalities per attack was high at 30 deaths per attack by Fulani herdsmen, while the average for cattle rustling stood at 39 per attack. There were four times as many attacks on communities by herdsmen than incidents of cattle rustling. Unlike the Boko Haram insurgency, the majority of the deaths in the pastoral conflict are not the belligerent herdsmen, but residents of the attacked communities.
- While there were a significant number of Niger Delta militant attacks on oil facilities, the average number of fatalities per attack was the lowest, at 3 per attack.


The charts and table below summarize these findings:

Security challenges by type



| Security Challenge | Number of Incidents | Fatalities | Average Fatalities Per Incident |
|--|---------------------|--------------|---------------------------------|
| Boko Haram* | 71 | 1,240 | 17 |
| Cattle Rustling | 12 | 470 | 39 |
| Fulani Herdsmen | 47 | 1,425 | 30 |
| <i>Pastoral Conflict Totals</i> | <i>59</i> | <i>1,895</i> | <i>32</i> |
| Niger Delta Militancy | 32 | 97 | 3 |
| Total | 162 | 3,232 | 20 |

TABLE: Incidents, and fatalities, that SBM Intel was able to verify.





| Casualty Type | Count |
|---------------|-------|
| Military | 71 |
| Boko Haram | 929 |
| Civilian | 240 |

Boko Haram

The Boko Haram insurgency started as a clash between security operatives and a Muslim sect. What we have now, which is a result of poor handling, is a full blown insurgency. In December 2016, the Nigerian Army liberated the sect's hitherto solid base of operations in the Sambisa Forest in Borno State.

While the strategic value of this is significant, the Nigerian government must not lose sight of the uphill task ahead given that the sect has morphed from a land-grabbing, territory-holding army, into a classic hit-and-run guerilla band. Sambisa might have been denied as a refuge and forward base to the insurgents, but there are still Boko Haram sanctuaries across the border, and even in the Mandara mountains that stretch from Nigeria into Cameroon. Even more frightening, is the increase in the use of young girls as suicide bombers.

| State | Number of Incidents | Number of Fatalities |
|--------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| Adamawa | 1 | 10 |
| Borno | 67 | 1,226 |
| Taraba | 1 | 0 |
| Yobe | 2 | 4 |
| TOTAL | 113 | 1,240 |

TABLE: Boko Haram incidents within Nigeria

The pastoral conflict

Cattle rustling, which had lost prominence for many years, has now become a *casus belli* for attacks by herdsmen who are mainly of Fulani descent.

Zamfara State, with 446 casualties and 9 incidents involving cattle rustlers had a single incident of Fulani Herdsmen attack in the year under review. Apart from Zamfara, Katsina with a single cattle rustling incident also recorded one attack which was blamed on herdsmen.

However, Adamawa, Benue, Enugu and Kaduna, which recorded high numbers of incidents involving Fulani herdsmen, many of these attacks with high fatality numbers, did not record any verifiable incidents of cattle rustling. This puts a hole in the argument that the rise in Fulani Herdsmen attacks correlates with the rise in cattle rustling activities.

It also, at least in part, lends some strength to the argument that some of the recent confrontations in these states may be the result of host communities directly confronting the herdsmen – a position which has found currency among defenders of some of the herdsmen's action. This group of people have cited the Fulani's historic culture of honour and revenge which is an outflow from its warrior-like

interaction with the peoples that inhabit what is modern northern Nigeria.

Speaking specifically to attacks by herdsmen, 2016's bloodbath began on the 24th of January, with an attack that left thirty people, including a Divisional Police Officer, dead in Adamawa State. The perpetrators are believed to be herdsmen.

February saw verifiable fatalities of 352 spread between Benue and Enugu states. These attacks left scores injured, properties destroyed and thousands of locals displaced. The attacks in Benue occurred on the 8th, 26th and 28th with a total of 350 lives lost while that of Enugu happened on Valentine's day with 2 dead and 19 others missing.

March of 2016 was the bloodiest month in relation to Fulani Herdsmen attacks. More than five hundred people were killed in and around Agatu in Benue State.

By the end of the year, most of the attacks were concentrated in Kaduna. These attacks intensified after the governor of the state admitted to paying some Fulani communities, some outside Nigeria, compensation money.




| State | Number of Incidents | Number of Fatalities |
|--------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| Kano | 1 | 12 |
| Kastina | 1 | 6 |
| Niger | 1 | 6 |
| Zamfara | 9 | 446 |
| TOTAL | 12 | 470 |

Table: SBM Intelligence breakdown of incidents and fatalities involving cattle rustlers.

| State | Number of Incidents | Number of Fatalities |
|--------------|---------------------|----------------------|
| Adamawa | 5 | 57 |
| Anambra | 1 | 3 |
| Abuja | 1 | 1 |
| Benue | 12 | 1042 |
| Delta | 3 | 4 |
| Edo | 1 | 1 |
| Enugu | 3 | 51 |
| Imo | 1 | 7 |
| Kaduna | 8 | 118 |
| Kastina | 1 | 8 |
| Kwara | 1 | 5 |
| Nasarawa* | 2 | 20 |
| Ogun | 1 | 3 |
| Ondo | 1 | 1 |
| Plateau | 1 | 22 |
| Taraba | 4 | 21 |
| Zamfara | 1 | 50 |
| TOTAL | 47 | 1425 |

Table: SBM Intelligence verified fatal incidents involving herdsmen in 2016. Note that the figures are different from those reported by media, and various NGOs. One of the incidents in Nasarawa State was a reprisal attack by the locals against a group of herdsmen.



MAP: SBM Intelligence verified fatalities in the pastoral conflict in 2016. States coloured **RED** are states with incidents of herdsmen attacks. States coloured **MAROON** are states with incidents of cattle rustling. Katsina and Zamfara had incidents of both categories with fatalities.




CHART: SBM Intelligence verified fatalities and incidents in the pastoral conflict in 2016, grouped by geo-political zones.



Oil wars

The global drop in oil prices played a great part in the economic decline of Nigeria in the past year. Being a country with oil as its highest earner, the rise in oil related conflicts and sabotage saw a mass deployment of security operatives to help stem the tide. The oil wars of 2016 spread across from the oil producing states in the Niger Delta, to the oil producing states in the South West and South East. Here is a comprehensive breakdown of oil related incidents and their resulting casualties.

| State | Number of Incidents | Security Operatives Killed | Militants Killed |
|--------------|---------------------|----------------------------|------------------|
| Akwa Ibom | 2 | 0 | 0 |
| Bayelsa | 6 | 3 | 24 |
| Cross River | 4 | 0 | 7 |
| Delta | 9 | 4 | 0 |
| Enugu | 1 | 0 | 23 |
| Imo | 1 | 0 | 0 |
| Lagos | 5 | 0 | 16* |
| Ogun | 2 | 0 | 15 |
| Rivers | 2 | 0 | 5 |
| TOTAL | 32 | 7 | 90 |

TABLE: SBM Intelligence data on oil related incidents.
*The 16 deaths recorded in Lagos were all civilian casualties

Nigeria's reaction

The reaction of the Nigerian state to the pastoral conflicts in particular, brings to the fore the question of what value the state places on citizens' lives. We had, in 2016, multiple situations where some groups killed other Nigerians with impunity, justified their murders openly, and the government did little or nothing to punish the killers or put an end to the killings. The number one thing that legitimises a government is the ability to protect the life of its citizens. The Nigerian state appears more interested in revenue, than in human life.

Regarding the oil wars, President Muhammadu Buhari had in his first full budget, slashed the allocation to the Presidential Amnesty Programme. This year, he has tripled the allocation to the programme following the unrest in 2016. At the 2017 budget presentation, the President said, "The increased vote of ₦9.52 billion for the Federal Ministry of Environment (an increase of 92% over the 2016 allocation) underscores the greater attention to matters of the environment, including climate change and leveraging private sector funding for the clean-up of the Niger Delta. In this regard, the allocation for the Presidential Amnesty Programme has been increased to ₦65 billion in the 2017 Budget."

While cutting off funding to the programme suddenly at the start of 2016 was a grave tactical error, we fear that throwing more money at it is an even worse mistake.

Years of oil bunkering, smuggling, and attacks on farming communities have left a negative economic footprint on Nigeria. An SBM report

dated October 2015 detailed evidence of diminishing food supplies in relation to the intensification of the pastoral conflict. The Nigerian military, from years of dealing with a revolving door of armed militia, should have a clear and vivid operational memory of how these militiamen live, work and operate; and as a result, know how to pacify them.

This has not been the case. The response from the government and the security institutions do not demonstrate a clear understanding of the worsening situation. Rather, they show a tepid desire and will to pursue the protection of Nigerians from threats, except for threats that can directly harm the state's main interest-maintaining the flow of crude oil.

This apathy on the part of the state has emboldened especially, the herdsmen; and that has the ripple effect of angering other communities, forcing them to consider violence as a viable option. The apparent success of the violent herdsmen and oil militants in their rampaging endeavours, has granted increasing legitimacy to their methods amongst those who might have once opposed such violence within their ranks and beyond.

It is dangerous to refuse to acknowledge this, as our recent experience with Boko Haram has shown. It takes only a little nudge forward for what we see as marauders of civilian targets to begin to take on whole army formations. By that time, it will be a lot more difficult to defeat them, at a considerable cost in men, finances and logistics to the Nigerian state.

ABOUT SBM INTEL

SBM Intel is an Africa-focused market intelligence and communications consulting firm focused on addressing the critical need for market data and big data analytics.

We employ various methods of data collection such as personal interviewing, telephone, mail and the Internet. Depending on the survey design, our methods can be used separately or combined. Our Data Collection Methodology (DCM) team advises on data collection methods for all ONS social and business surveys. With clients both within the business and the wider government community, we aim to provide expert advice on data collection procedures and carry out research leading to improvements in survey quality.

Our firm's strategic communication services are designed to influence the stakeholders critical to our clients' objectives. We are a lean and fast machine that combines creative messaging and the right channels to deliver measurable and competitive business results.

We help organisations identify opportunities, keep an eye on the competition and be informed about market trends. We also combine our in-depth understanding of the Nigerian market with 360 degrees strategic communication skills to influence those that matter most to our clients

Since 2014, when SBM Intel started its operations, the firm has provided data analytics and strategic communication solutions to dozens of clients across various sectors in Nigeria, Ghana, Cote d'Ivoire and the United Kingdom.

In 2015 we became a partner to Stratfor, an American geopolitical intelligence firm that provides strategic analysis and forecasting to individuals and organisations around the world, including the various United States departments and agencies like the Department of Defense (DoD) and the Federal Bureau of Investigations (FBI). Since the partnership came into effect, several SBM Intel generated reports have been published on the Stratfor website; stratfor.com.